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Whilst policy makers have so far been unable to effectively address most of the issues 
raised by the trade-environment question, the WTO as the foremost dispute resolution 
mechanism in this arena, has been forced to confront these issue as cases have arisen 
that required judicial pronouncement.  The dispute resolution machinery of the WTO 
have furthermore been forced to re-examine their approaches in the light of the 
increasing importance placed on environmental issues.  A much more purposive 
approach is becoming apparent, one in which a willingness to take the evolutionary 
nature of views regarding environment into account is evident.  It also seems as if 
dispute resolution bodies such as those of the WTO are, up to a certain extent, 
prepared to consider measures aimed at environmental protection per se as justifying 
restrictions on free trade.  In this sense, the supposed conflict between environmental 
protection and the liberalisation of international trade is more apparent than real.   
 
However, it is argued that it is necessary that the importance of both liberalised 
international trade and the need to protect and conserve the environment should be 
reconsidered, and clear, substantive guidelines should be formulated.  The policy 
makers – Nation States in their capacities as international legal subjects and as 
members of the WTO, should do this.  Despite the trend towards more purposive legal 
analyses by the WTO dispute resolution bodies, they are not, after all, the true policy 
makers and should not be expected to act as such.  Even at the international level, and 
even with a decidedly more pro-environment sentiment, the maxim ius dicere, sed 
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1. INTRODUCTION    
 
We are living in an increasingly globalised community, in which the transboundary 
nature of both environmental and trade concerns are increasingly acknowledged. 
 
One of the international organisations that have been at the forefront of globalisation 
through its liberalisation of international trade is the World Trade Organisation (“the 
WTO”).  Over the last few years, environmental and other lobbyists have increasingly 
targeted this organisation.  For example, more than six hundred people were arrested 
in connection with “anti-globalisation” demonstrations that occurred when the WTO 
met in Seattle, Washington from 30 November 1999 to 3 December 1999.
1
  Two 
years after the controversy in Seattle, environmental issues remained matters of 




During the latter half of the twentieth century, concerns about the environment and 
attempts at redressing these concerns have shown a steady growth.  The International 
Court of Justice has stressed that ‘the environment is not an abstraction but represents 
the living space, the quality of life and the very health of human beings, including 
generations unborn’.3    
 
The Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro in June 
1992 gave significant momentum to the shaping and development of the international 
environmental legal order.  Instruments such as the Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development,
4
 the Program of Action Agenda 21
5
 and the Conventions on 
Climate Change
6
 and on Biological Diversity
7
 have entrenched notions and principles 
such as “sustainable development” and the “precautionary principle”.  However, it 
should be stressed that, ‘[u]nlike the development of domestic environmental policy, 
                                                 
1
 Dixon, C., “Environmental Survey of WTO Dispute Panel Resolution Panel Decisions Since 1995: 
‘Trade at all Costs?’”  2000 (24) William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review 89 n 1. 
2
 Maki, T., “Bridging the Gap between Northern NGOs and Southern Sovereigns in the Trade-
Environment Debate: The Pursuit of Democratic Dispute Settlements in the WTO under the Rio 
Principles” 2003 (30(1)) Ecology Law Quarterly 113 at 115. 
3
 Boisson-de-Chazournes, L., “Unilateralism and Environmental Protection: Issues of Perception and 
Reality of Issues” 2000 (11) European Journal of International Law 315 at 319 n 17. 
4
 UN Doc.  A/Conf.151/26/REV.1 (Vol. I) 3. 
5
 UN Conference on Environment and Development: Agenda 21, UN Doc. A/CONF.15/4 1992. 
6
 Framework Convention on Climate Change 1992. 
7
 Convention on Biological Diversity 1992. 
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the nature and processes involved in the formation of international environmental law 
give rise to an inherent vagueness of what is to be protected, where it is to be 
protected, and by whom it is to be protected.’8 
 
The development and increased importance of environmental awareness, coupled with 
an earlier bias towards free trade sans modern notions of environmental 
responsibility, have impacted on the interpretation of international law.  Some authors 
maintain that the system is still structured in favour of free trade at the cost of 
sufficient and effective environmental protection.
9
  Others point out that 
“[W]ith the lack of clear guidance on how to handle environment-trade 
questions, policy responsibility on the issue has been de facto delegated 
to…[international] tribunals.  Of course, having to take decisions on 
controversial subjects is an intrinsic function of any judicial body, but 
one does get the sense that in their attempts to arrive at an acceptable 
balance between free trade and environmental protection, such tribunals 
are having to develop law where policy-makers have previously feared 
to tread.”10   
 
The following analysis seeks to address two central questions:  Firstly, is there a 
conflict between liberalised international trade and the protection of the environment, 
and if so, to what extent?  This issue will be explored through a scrutiny of relevant 
environmental cases adjudicated by the World Trade Organisation and its predecessor, 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”).  Secondly, if it is taken that 
some conflict does exist, and when juxtaposed against the objective of free 
international trade, how far is the WTO willing and, in fact, able to accommodate 
environmental concerns?   
 
In order to address these two issues, this paper is divided into five basic sections.  The 
first section briefly explains the dispute resolution procedure/s and mechanism/s 
provided for under the auspices of GATT and the WTO.  The second section provides 
a brief discussion of the treaty provisions of the WTO as they relate to the 
environment-trade issue.  Against this background the third section provides a critical 
                                                 
8
 Brotmann, M., “The Clash Between the WTO and the ESA: Drowning a Turtle to Eat a Shrimp” 1999 
(16) Pace Environmental Law Review 321 at 325. 
9
 Dixon op. cit 90. 
10
 French, D., “The Changing Nature of ‘Environmental Protection’: Recent Developments Regarding 
Trade and the Environment in the European Union and the World Trade Organisation” 2000 (47) 
Netherlands International Law Review 1 at 11. 
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discussion of the emerging case law on the trade-versus-environment polemic.  The 
fourth section binds together the preceding sections by evaluating the role played by 
the WTO in its role as adjudicator in environment-versus-trade disputes.  In the fifth 
section a few suggestions are made as to how the WTO may better address the 
environment/trade relationship.  
 
Finally, a tentative conclusion is offered that a movement can be discerned from an 
initially predominantly legalistic approach to trade-related international environmental 
disputes, which tended to favour unrestricted trade, towards a more creative use of 
‘environmental protection’ as a justification for trade restrictions.  In spite of this 
seemingly greater willingness by the dispute resolution bodies of the WTO to 
interpret relevant GATT provisions in a more pro-environment manner, it is submitted 
that theirs should not be the task of finding a solution to the trade-versus-environment 
debate.  This is an issue that should be addressed at the political level.   
 
2. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDER THE GENERAL 
AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE AND THE 




The WTO identifies itself as being “the only international body dealing with the rules 
of trade between nations.”11    Before its creation in 1994, the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) was applied.  This agreement had as its primary aim the 
reduction of trade barriers and the promotion of liberalised international trade
12
 - an 
aim that GATT fulfilled successfully over the 47 years between its inception in 1948 
and its succession by the WTO in 1995.
13
    
 
The final round of multilateral trade negotiations conducted under the auspices of the 
GATT as an organisation was the Uruguay Round, which was launched in September 
1986, and concluded in April 1994 at Marrakesh, Morocco.  The Uruguay Round led 
                                                 
11
 World Trade Organization, Trading into the Future: The World Trade Organization 2001 at 4. 
12
 Brotmann  op. cit  330. 
13
 World Trade Organization op. cit 10. 
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to a number of agreements.  In addition to the creation of the WTO14 (and the 
retention of the GATT as an international agreement)15 the Uruguay Round led to the 
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (“the SPS agreement”); the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (“the TBT agreement”); the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures16 as well as the Dispute Settlement 
Procedures.17   
 
The WTO states that it has three main purposes.
18
  The first is to help trade flow as 
freely as possible, not only by removing obstacles to trade, but also by ensuring 
certainty concerning trade rules around the world.  The second purpose of the WTO is 
to serve as a forum for trade negotiations.  Its third purpose is dispute settlement.  The 
importance of the latter lies in the fact that, given the conflicting interests that are 
often at the centre of trade disputes, having a neutral procedure, based on agreed-upon 
legal foundations, makes peaceful resolution possible.   
 
2.2 Dispute Settlement before 1994 
 
It could be argued that under GATT 1947, dispute resolution fell far short of the goals 
of compliance and certainty discussed above.  The dispute resolution Panels had no 
real “teeth” as they could only suggest that the contracting parties make 
recommendations to the party “losing” a dispute.19  GATT did not authorise 
retaliation by an injured country, unless all GATT contracting parties (including the 
country that lost the case) unanimously consented thereto. 
 
                                                 
14
 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (hereafter “Marrakesh 
Agreement”), Article I. 
15
 Ibid, Article II:2. 
16
 Ibid. Annexure 1. 
17
 Ibid, Annexure 2. 
18
 Ibid, Article III. 
19 Cf. Canada – Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring 
and Salmon L/6268 – 35S/98 1988 at 5.4 
5 
 
GATT contracting parties inevitably became aware of its enforcement shortcomings, 
and compliance with its rulings deteriorated.  During the last few years of its 




Another limitation of the dispute settlement procedure followed under GATT is the 
fact that Panels were strictly limited to an individual mandate per “case” – a Panel 
could not, for example, consider other relevant submissions such as references to 
relevant international agreements, etc.
21
 Although some progress has been made in 
this respect under the WTO,
22
 questions of procedure relating to the admissibility of 
third party submissions continue to be controversial. 
 
2.3 Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO 
 
In establishing the WTO the contracting members hoped to create an efficient and 
effective mechanism within the organisation that could handle dispute resolution.  It is 
argued that, by having a central mechanism by which to resolve disputes, nations are 
afforded the opportunity to obtain a fair hearing without being subject to threats of 
reprisals.
23
  The Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”)24 came into existence as 
a result of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations on 1 January 1995, and, based 
on over five decades of GATT dispute settlements, sought to introduce a more 




The dispute settlement procedure is designed to promote consultation and mediation 
and resolve all disputes within a short period of time.  From beginning to end, the 
                                                 
20
 Stiles, K.W., “The New WTO Regime: The Victory of Pragmatism” 1996 (4) Journal of 
International Law and Practice 9. 
21 Canada – Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon L/6268 – 
35S/98 1988 paragraph 5.3 where the Panel stated that “…its mandate was limited to the 
examination of Canada’s measures in the light of the relevant provisions of the General 
Agreement,” (and that the Convention on the Law of the Sea could thus not be considered) 
(own emphasis). 
22
 See the discussion of the Asbestos case in paragraph 4.2.4 below. 
23
 Brotman op. cit 331. 
24
Marrakesh Agreement op.cit Annex 2 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes. 
25
 Lawson, T., “WTO Dispute Resolution: The Promotion of Diplomacy within an Adjudicative 
Model” 1997 (6) Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies 321.  See also Miller, C., “The WTO: Biting the 
hand that fed it” 2003 (44(5)) William and Mary Law Review 2324. 
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dispute settlement process is scheduled to take no more than one year.
26
  Appeals can 
add another three months to the process. 
 
The DSU made several significant changes to GATT dispute rules and procedures, the 
most important of which is that disputing parties are placed under an obligation to 
adopt a WTO Panel report, unless a party notifies the Dispute Settlement Body of the 
WTO (“the DSB”) that it plans to appeal, or unless the DSB decides by consensus not 
to adopt the report.
27
  This is a drastic departure from the earlier GATT practice of 
giving any losing country the ability to veto an unfavourable Panel decision.
28
    
Finally, injured members are given stronger means with which to retaliate against 




From the above it seems that non-compliance by a member of its GATT commitments 
are potentially strongly actionable, in that the DSU, and the dispute settlement 
mechanism created therein, provide potentially very powerful tools of enforcement to 
injured members.  Against this background we now turn to the central underlying 
problem encountered in the trade-versus-environment issue, namely the way in which 
environmental policies and or –measures that infringe on GATT commitments are: (1) 
addressed in the GATT itself, and: (2) adjudicated upon by the WTO dispute 
resolution body. 
 
2.4 An institutional bias toward trade? 
 
The accusation of an institutional bias in favour of free trade is often levelled against 
the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO.  On the one hand such an accusation 
might seem unreasonable, as the WTO is, after all, a trade organisation with a stated 
aim of liberalising international trade, and not an environmental protection agency.
30
 
                                                 
26
 DSU Appendix 3: Working procedures. 
27
 Ibid Article 16(4). 
28
 Miller op. cit 2327.  See also Wofford, C., “A Greener Future at the WTO: The Refinement of WTO 
Jurisprudence on Environmental Exceptions to GATT”, 2000 (24(2)) Harvard Environmental Law 
Review 563 at 572. 
29
 DSU Article 22. 
30
It must be noted, however, that an institutional trade-bias is alleged not only regarding environmental 
disputes but also concerning other disputes.  See Greenwald, J., “WTO Dispute Settlement: An exercise 
in Trade Law Legislation?” 2003 (6(1)) Journal of International Economic Law 125.  An in-depth 
discussion of this allegation is, however, beyond the scope of this paper. 
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However, the WTO itself has been at considerable pains recently to demonstrate a 
willingness to accommodate environmental concerns.  For example, the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration clearly states: 
“We strongly reaffirm our commitment to the objective of sustainable 
development, as stated in the Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement.  We 
are convinced that the aims of upholding and safeguarding an open and 
non-discriminatory multilateral trading system, and acting for the 
protection of the environment and the promotion of sustainable 
development can and must be mutually supportive.”31 
 
 
3. GATT / WTO PROVISIONS AND MEASURES RELEVANT 
TO THE ENVIRONMENT 
 
3.1 Non-Discrimination:  The most-favoured nation principle and the 
national treatment principle 
 
Despite the changes to the organisational structure after the Uruguay Round, the 
fundamental principles of GATT remain unaltered.  In essence, the GATT – and 
ultimately world trade law – is based on the notion of non-discrimination, which is 
expressed in two principles, viz., “most-favoured nation” (“MFN”) and “national 
treatment”.  These two non-discrimination principles are essential for the full 
realisation of the aim of lowered tariffs, which are binding obligations under GATT 
Article II. 
 
The most-favoured nation principle is found in Article I of the GATT, which provides 
that in respect of any … 
“customs duties and charges of any kind…[or] any advantage, favour, 
privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product 
originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded 
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or 
destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.”   
 
Thus, if a member gives an advantage to one state, it should also be granted to all 
the other WTO members.
32
 
                                                 
31
 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, Doha, 9-14 November 2001 
Ministerial Declaration 2001 WT/MIN (01)/DEC/1 (“herein Doha Ministerial Declaration”), item 6. 
32




The “national treatment” provision found in Article III (4) of the GATT stipulates 
that once goods have entered a market, they must be treated no less favourably than 
equivalent domestically produced goods.  In other words, this article demand that 
imported products be treated the same as “like (domestic) products”.33   
 
The relevant question, at this stage, is to determine what would happen if a country 
violates its WTO obligation of non-discrimination in order to fulfil an environmental 
commitment, be it domestic such as the national US legislation aimed at preserving 
endangered species
34
 or in terms of another international treaty, such as the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (“CITES”).  A related 
question is whether or not a country may impose its own environmental standard/s 
extra-territorially.
35
 The answer lies in the correct interpretation of GATT Article 
XX. 
  
3.2 GATT Article XX – The “Green Exception” 
  
The MFN and national treatment clauses are subject to the “general exceptions” 
contained within Article XX of the GATT, the important provisions of which for 
purposes of this paper are the introductory clause (commonly referred to as the 
“chapeau”) together with paragraphs (b) and (g).  They read as follows: 
“Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or 
a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement 
shall be construed to prevent the adoption of enforcement by any 
contracting party of measures:… 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health… 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such 
measures are made effective in conjunction with restriction on 
domestic production or consumption.” 
 
                                                 
33
 Article III:4 reads as follows: “The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into 
the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that 
accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements 
affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.” 
34
 See the discussions of the Tuna Dolphin and Shrimp-Turtle cases below in paragraph 4. 
35
 The Tuna-Dolphin and Shrimp-Turtle cases illustrate this concept very well as both dealt with 
environmental Acts by the United States in which the standards of other countries were prescribed by 
an internal US Statute.  See the discussions below in paragraph 4. 
9 
 
It is hoped that from the discussion of cases dealing with Article XX below two things 
will become clear.  Firstly, in very few of the GATT 1947 cases purporting to fall 
under the exceptions provided in Article XX did the action complained about actually 
seem to have environmental protection as primary aim.  In fact, in most instances 




 were clearly the main objectives 
of the action/s complained of.
38
  Secondly, a definite willingness to accommodate 
environmental concerns while simultaneously enforcing WTO obligations can be 
discerned in the way the Appellate Body approached GATT 1994 disputes.  This is 
especially clear when the results of two highly publicised “environmental” cases are 
compared, namely the “Tuna Dolphin” disputes39 under GATT 1947, and the 
“Shrimp-Turtle” disputes40 under GATT 1994.41  
 
While Articles XX (b) and (g) identify the kind of measures that may be condoned, 
the chapeau sets out the tests for the manner in which the trade measure is applied.  In 
the majority of cases discussed below, the dispute resolution bodies first categorised 
the trade measure as either falling under one of the subcategories in Article XX.
42
  If 
so, the threefold test contained in the chapeau is then applied.
43
   
 
                                                 
36
 See, for example, the discussion of Canada – Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring 
and Salmon L/6268 – 35S/98 1988 (hereinafter “Fish Export Ban”) in paragraph 4.1.2, and of 
Thailand – Restrictions on the Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes DS10/R – 37S/200 
1990 (hereinafter “Thailand: Cigarettes”) in paragraph 4.1.3 below. 
37
 See the discussion of United States – Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from 
Canada L/5198 –29S/91 1982 (hereinafter “Tuna Import Ban”) in paragraph 4.1.1 below.  
38
 See also the discussion by Oesterle, D.A., “The WTO Reaches Out to the Environmentalists:  Is It 
Too Little, Too Late?” 1999/2000 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 1 
at 11-12 which highlights the concerns by developing countries that the US often promulgate 
environmental statutes and rules primarily to protect failing American industries. 
39
 United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna DS21/R – 39S/155 (Mexican Complaint) Panel 
Report not adopted, but circulated in 1991 (hereinafter “Tuna Dolphin I”) and United States – 
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna DS29/R (EU Complaint) Panel Report not adopted but circulated in 
1994 (hereinafter “Tuna Dolphin II”).  See the discussion of these decisions in paragraphs 4.1.4 and 
5.1.5 below. 
40
 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products WT/DS58/R 1998 
Report of the Panel and United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products 
WT/DS58/AB/R 1998 Appellate Body Report (hereinafter “Shrimp-Turtle I”).  See also United States 
–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by 
Malaysia WT/DS58/RW 2001 Report of the Panel, and United States –Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia WT/DS58/AB/RW 
2001 Appellate Body Report (hereinafter “Shrimp-Turtle II”). 
41
 See the discussions of the Shrimp-Turtle disputes in paragraphs 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 below. 
42
 The notable exceptions to this methodology are Tuna Import Ban, op.cit, and the Panel Report in 
Shrimp-Turtle I where the measure at issue was first tested against the chapeau, after which the relevant 
sub-articles were scrutinised.  See the discussions in paragraph 4.1.1 and 4.2.2 below. 
43
 See paragraph 3.2.3 below. 
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In keeping with the above, a brief theoretical exposition of the two relevant sub-
articles will first be given, followed by the chapeau, providing the context for the 
subsequent discussions of the relevant disputes in paragraph 4.   After the case 
discussions, Article XX will be revisited in order to highlight how far the notion of 
environmental protection has gained ground since the earlier environmental cases 
under the GATT 1947. 
 
3.2.1 Article XX (b): “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health” 
 
Article XX (b) has two requirements:  (1) the trade-restricting measure must be 
“necessary”; and (2) it must be aimed at protecting human, animal or plant life or 
health.  In the case discussions below it will be clear that interpretation of the word 
“necessary” provided the major stumbling block in the application of this sub-article.   
 
Under GATT 1947 the word “necessary” was interpreted very restrictively.  In 
Thailand - Cigarettes the Panel found that a measure could only be considered to be 
“necessary” in terms of Article XX (b) if there were no alternative measure consistent 
with the GATT, or less inconsistent with it, which could reasonably be employed to 
achieve the policy objective.
44
  The same reasoning was followed in both the Tuna 
Dolphin I 
45
and Tuna Dolphin II 
46
decisions.   
 
Under GATT 1994 the scope was widened considerably, primarily through the report 
of the Appellate Body in European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-containing Products.
47
  In this case it was held that, if there was an 
alternative measure consistent with the GATT, but such alternative measure could not 
deliver the same end as the GATT-inconsistent measure, it would not be regarded as a 
reasonable alternative.
48
  In other words, a balancing approach is followed when 
testing the necessity of restrictions on trade for environmental purposes.  This is 
                                                 
44
 Op. cit paragraph 75. 
45
 Op.cit paragraph 5.27. 
46
 Op.cit paragraph 5.35. 
47
 WT/DS135/AB/R 2001 Appellate Body Report (hereinafter “Asbestos”). 
48
 Ibid paragraph 172. 
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3.2.2 Article XX (g):  “relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with 
restriction on domestic production or consumption 
 
Paragraph (g) contains three concepts that have proven to be open to interpretation.  
There has been disagreement about, firstly, what exactly constitutes an “exhaustible 
natural resource”.  Could a living, renewable thing (such as a species of animal, for 
example) be regarded as “exhaustible”?  Although parties before a tribunal have 
argued the contrary,
50
 the dispute settlement body of the WTO has consistently 
acknowledged that “exhaustible natural resource” does not exclude animals that are 
able to reproduce themselves. 
 
Secondly, when can a GATT-inconsistent measure be understood to be “relating to” 
the conservation of such an exhaustible resource?
51
  Does this mean that the measure 
had to be primarily aimed at conservation, or would something less – such as an 
incidental environmental aim - suffice?   
 
Thirdly, when exactly would a trade measure be “made effective in conjunction with 
restriction on domestic production or consumption”?  
 
 
3.2.3 The chapeau 
 
As stated above, the majority of tribunals first classified a measure as falling under 
one of the sub-articles of Article XX.  If so, the manner in which the trade measure is 
applied is then tested against the threefold criteria of the chapeau:  Whether it 
amounts to (1) arbitrary discrimination; (2) unjustifiable discrimination and (3) a 
                                                 
49
 Matsushika, M., Schoenbaum, T.J. and Mavroidis, P.C,  “Environmental Protection and Trade” in 
The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice and Policy 2003 Oxford University Press 439 at 454. 
50
 E.g. in Tuna-Dolphin I Mexico argued that the term “exhaustible natural resources” could not 
justifiably be extended to include “fisheries and fishery products, nor in fact any living being”. Op. cit 
paragraph 3.42. 
51
 Ibid at 451-452. 
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disguised restriction on international trade.  From the case discussions below it will 
become clear that most of the environmental measures fail to clear this last hurdle.  
This is because the chapeau protects “both substantive and procedural” requirements 




Following this brief theoretical exposition of Article XX the relevant cases will now 
be examined. 
 
4. Emerging case law under the WTO dealing with environmental 
issues 
 
4.1 Historical development: Disputes under the GATT 1947 
 
4.1.1 United States – Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from 
 Canada 
53
   
 
In 1979 Canada seized nineteen US fishing vessels and arrested several of its 
nationals fishing for albacore tuna, without authorisation from the Canadian 
government, in waters considered by Canada to be under its jurisdiction.
54
  The 
United States did not recognise this jurisdiction.  Shortly afterward it introduced an 
import prohibition against Canadian tuna under Section 205 (Import Prohibitions) of 




Upon a complaint by Canada, the Panel found that the US measure fell foul of Article 
XI,
56
 after which it turned its attention to the question whether or not the measure 
could nevertheless be justified under Article XX.  It started off by first examining the 
preamble to Article XX.
57
  Without stating its reasons for doing so, it found that the 
US measure “might not necessarily have been arbitrary or unjustifiable”.  As to the 
question whether the prohibition could be considered to be a disguised restriction on 
                                                 
52
 Shrimp-Turtle I Appellate Body report, op.cit paragraphs 157 – 158. 
53
 L/5198 – 29S/91 Report of the Panel adopted on 22 February 1982 (herein referred to as “Tuna 
Import Ban”). 
54
 Ibid, paragraph 2.1. 
55
 Ibid, paragraph 2.2. 
56
 Ibid, paragraphs 4.4 to 4.6.  Article XI deals with the elimination of quantitative restrictions. 
57
 Ibid, paragraph 4.8. 
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international trade, the Panel, rather simplistically, it is submitted, found the contrary.  
It seems as if this conclusion was reached mainly because the US had “publicly 
announced” its measure.   
 
Having first dealt with the chapeau in this brief fashion, the Panel turned its attention 
to sub-section (g) of Article XX.  It noted that, although both parties agreed that tuna 
stocks constituted an exhaustible natural resource, Article XX (g) demanded that such 
measures had to be made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption.  It noted that the United States had restricted the 
importation from Canada of all tuna species and –products, but that there were no 
correlative restrictions on the US domestic production or consumption of tuna.
58
  The 
United States’ defence based on Article XX (g) was therefore rejected. 
 
Even taking into consideration that this was a very early “environmental” case 
considered by a GATT Panel, the way in which the chapeau was dealt with seems 
rather weak in that any motivation for the Panel’s conclusions were either absent or 
formulated rather half-heartedly.  Nevertheless, the Panel’s conclusion cannot be 
faulted.  The US measure was clearly a commercial counter-measure and it is 
submitted that it has been given a “green veneer” purely in order to circumvent the 
GATT obligations freely entered into by the US. 
 





In terms of the Canadian Fisheries Act of 1970, Canada prohibited the export of 
certain unprocessed salmon as well as unprocessed herring.
60
  The United States 
claimed that such export restrictions were inconsistent with the obligations of Canada 
under Article XI of the General Agreement, and could not be justified under any of 
                                                 
58
 Ibid, paragraph 4.9. 
59
 L/6268 – 35S/98 Report of the Panel adopted on 22 March 1988 (herein referred to as “Fish export 
ban”). 
60
 Ibid, paragraphs 2.1 and 2.2: “Paragraph 6 of the Pacific Commercial Salmon Fisheries Regulations, 
promulgated under authority of sub-section 34(j) of the Act,  provided that: ‘No person shall export 
from Canada any sockeye or pink salmon unless it is canned, salted, smoked, dried, pickled or frozen 
and has been inspected in accordance with the Fish Inspection Act…’”  A similar measure was taken 
for herring: cf. paragraph 2.3. 
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the exceptions provided for in that Article or under those of Article XX.
61
  Canada 
defended itself by arguing that the measures under review, although not conservation 
measures per se, were nevertheless components of its fisheries conservation and 
management regime and, as such, justified under Article XX (g).
62
   
 
It was common cause between the parties that salmon and herring stocks are, indeed, 
“exhaustible natural resources”, and that Canada did indeed make its measure 
effective “in conjunction with restriction on domestic production or consumption” 
within the purposes of Article XX (g).
63
  Thus having cleared two hurdles contained 
in sub-paragraph (g), the Panel considered the final bone of contention contained 
therein:  the meaning of the phrase:  “related to… conservation”.  The question was 
whether this meant that any relationship with conservation would be sufficient for a 
trade measure to fall under Article XX (g), or whether a particular relationship is 
required.   
 
On the one hand, the Panel noted that some of the other subparagraphs of Article XX 
state that the relevant measure had to be “necessary” or “essential” to the achievement 
of the policy purpose.  Subparagraph (g) could therefore be taken as referring to a 
wider range of measures as the measure only had to be “related to” conservation.  On 
the other hand, the Panel found that, nonetheless, this did not entail unrestrictedly 
wide measures to be adapted under the guise of being in some or other way “related” 
to conservation.  It interpreted the chapeau to Article XX as indicating that the 
purpose of including Article XX (g) in the General Agreement was  
“…not to widen the scope for measures serving trade policy purposes 
but merely to ensure that the commitments under the General 
Agreement do not hinder the pursuit of policies aimed at the 
conservation of exhaustive natural resources.”64 
 
As such, the Panel found that, while a trade measure did not have to be necessary or 
essential to the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource, it had to be primarily 
aimed at the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource to be considered as 
                                                 
61
 Ibid, paragraph 3.1. 
62
 Ibid, paragraphs 3.3 and 3.5. 
63
 Ibid paragraph 4.5. 
64
 Ibid paragraph 4.6. 
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“relating to” conservation within the meaning of Article XX (g).65  As Canada itself 
had stated that its measure was not a conservation measure per se, it is therefore not 
surprising that the Panel went on to decide that the export prohibitions were not 
justified by Article XX (g). 
 
It is interesting to note that, in contrast to the Panel in Tuna Import Ban who 
considered the chapeau to Article XX before considering the Article itself, the Panel 
in Fish Export Ban started its analysis with the specific subparagraph of Article XX.  
The chapeau was analysed as a secondary step, and primarily in order to place the 
interpretation of sub-paragraph (g) in context.  Having decided that the measure did 
not meet the requirements set out in sub-paragraph (g), the Panel found it unnecessary 
to also analyse the requirements set out in the chapeau. 
 




In terms of Section 27 of its Tobacco Act of 1966, Thailand prohibited the importation 
of cigarettes and other tobacco preparations, but authorised the sale of domestic 
cigarettes.  Cigarettes were also subject to excise, business and municipal taxes.
67
   
Upon a complaint by the US the Panel found that the internal taxes were consistent 
with Article III: 2,
68
 but the import restrictions were found to be inconsistent with 




Regarding Article XX (b), the Panel agreed with the parties to the dispute and the 
expert evidence from the WHO that smoking constituted a serious risk to human 
health and that consequently measures designed to reduce the consumption of 
cigarettes fell within the scope of Article XX (b), and found that this provision 
“…clearly allowed contracting parties to give priority to human health over trade 
liberalization”.70   




 DS10/R – 37S/200 Report of the Panel adopted on 7 November 1990 (herein referred to as 
“Thailand – Cigarettes”). 
67
 Ibid paragraphs 6 and 7. 
68
 Ibid paragraphs 86 and 88. 
69
 Ibid paragraphs 67-71. 
70




However, the Panel continued to state that a measure such as the import restriction 
imposed by Thailand could only be considered to be “necessary” in terms of Article 
XX (b) if there were no alternative measure consistent with the GATT, or less 
inconsistent with it, which could reasonably be employed to achieve the policy 
objective.  The Panel pointed out that there were various alternative measures 
consistent with the GATT which were reasonably available to Thailand to control the 
quality and quantity of cigarettes smoked in Thailand and which, taken together, 
could have achieved the health policy goals pursued by Thailand, such as a ban on 
cigarette advertising, or incremental pricing increases.  For these reasons the Panel 
found that Thailand’s practice of permitting the sale of domestic cigarettes while not 
permitting the importation of foreign cigarettes was an inconsistency with the GATT 
not “necessary” within the meaning of Article XX (b).71 
 





4.1.4 United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna 72 (“Tuna-Dolphin I”) 
  
Despite the preceding environmental cases decided by the dispute resolution Panels of 
the GATT 1947, it was only after the decision in Tuna Dolphin I that the relationship 
between protection of the environment and international trade, once an “arcane 
specialty that attracted little attention” was catapulted into popular and academic 
conscience.
73
  Uproar ensued, mostly because in this instance, other than with the 
previous environmental cases, a genuinely environmental aim was found to be 
inconsistent with the GATT.  (The fact that the subject matter happened to be 
dolphins presumably also played an emotional part in the large coverage given to this 
case.) 
 
                                                 
71
 Ibid paragraphs 77-81. 
72
 DS21/R – 39S/155 (Mexican Complaint) Panel Report not adopted, but circulated in 1991 (herein 
referred to as “Tuna-Dolphin I”). 
73
 Matsushita, Schoenbaum and Mavroidis, op.cit 448.  
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Since tuna are often found swimming below dolphins in the eastern tropical Pacific 
Ocean
74
, fishing vessels in that region commonly encircle dolphins with purse-seine 
nets in order to capture tuna.
75
  Changes in US legislation aimed at reducing the 
incidental killing of dolphins due to such harvesting practices resulted in a dramatic 
drop in dolphin mortality, from an estimated 368 600 in 1972 to 5 083 in 1990.  By 





In the Tuna-Dolphin I dispute, the United States passed domestic legislation 
regulating the capture of tuna as a means of protecting dolphins.  In terms of the 
Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, as revised (“the MMPA”) the importation of 
commercial fish or products from fish caught with commercial fishing technology, 
which results in the incidental kill or incidental serious injury of ocean mammals in 
excess of US standards, was prohibited.
77
  (This was because dolphins are a protected 
species under the MMPA.)  In particular, the importation of yellowfin tuna harvested 
with purse-seine nets in the ETP was prohibited (primary nation embargo), unless the 
competent US authorities established that (i) the government of the harvesting country 
had a programme regulating takings of marine mammals that was comparable to that 
of the United States’, and (ii) the average rate of incidental taking of marine mammals 
by vessels of the harvesting nation was comparable to the average rate of such takings 
by US vessels.
78
  Imports of tuna from countries purchasing tuna from a country 
subject to the primary nation embargo were also prohibited (intermediary nation 
embargo).
79
   
 
                                                 
74
 Hereafter referred to as the “ETP”. 
75
 United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna DS29/R (EU Complaint) Panel Report not adopted 
but circulated in 1994 (herein referred to as “Tuna-Dolphin II”) at paragraph 5.1.  See full discussion 
of this case infra. 
76
 Cheyne, I., “Law and Ethics in the Trade and Environment Debate:  Tuna, Dolphins and Turtles” 
2000(12(3)) Journal of Environmental Law 293 at 295. 
77




 Ibid paragraph 2.10:  “Section 101(a)(2)(C) of the MMPA states that for purposes of applying the 
direct import prohibition…the Secretary of Commerce ‘shall require the Government of any 
intermediary nation from which yellowfin tuna or tuna products will be exported to the United States to 
certify and provide reasonable proof that it has acted to prohibit the importation of such tuna and tuna 
products from any nation from which direct export to the United States of such tuna and tuna products 




Upon a complaint by Mexico, the Panel found that the import prohibition under both 
the direct and the intermediary embargoes did not constitute “internal regulations” 
within the meaning of Article III.  It was pointed out that the MMPA did not regulate 
tuna products as such, and in particular did not regulate the sale of either tuna itself or 
tuna products.  Because the MMPA regulations concerned harvesting techniques that 
could not possibly affect tuna as a product, the ban on tuna harvested with purse-seine 
nets could not be justified in terms of the wording of Article III itself, which covers 
only measures affecting products as such.
80
   
 
The Panel further found that the import prohibition was inconsistent with Article XI: 1 
(which prohibits quantitative restrictions) – an allegation that the United States did not 
dispute.
81
  Having found thus, the Panel turned its attention to the exceptions raised by 
the United States under Article XX. 
 
First off, the Panel examined Article XX (b) and asked itself the question whether or 
not national measures deemed to fall under this subsection could be applied extra-
territorially.  The Panel examined the drafting history of the General Agreement and 
found that Article XX (b) did not extend to measures protecting human, animal or 
plant life outside of the jurisdiction of the country taking the measure.
82
  In addition, 
the Panel stated that, if the broad interpretation of Article XX (b) suggested by the 
United States were accepted, each contracting party could unilaterally determine the life 
or health protection policies from which other contracting parties could not deviate 
without jeopardising their rights under the GATT.
83
  Using the same reasoning, the 
Panel rejected the possible extra-jurisdictional application of Article XX (g) too.
84
   
 
The issue of extra-jurisdictionality of Articles XX (b) and (g) apart, the Panel found that 
the US measures did not meet the requirements set out in these two provisions in any 
event.  The US measure could not be considered to be “necessary” within the meaning 
of Article XX (b), as the United States had failed to demonstrate that it had exhausted 
all options reasonably available to it to pursue its dolphin protection objectives through 
                                                 
80
 Ibid paragraph 5.11. 
81
 Ibid paragraph 5.18. 
82
 Ibid paragraph 5.26. 
83
 Ibid paragraph 5.27. 
84
 Ibid paragraph 5.32. 
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measures consistent with the GATT.  The Panel therefore rejected the US view that 
“necessary” meant “needed”, stating that a measure would only qualify as “necessary” 
when no other reasonable (GATT-consistent, or less GATT-inconsistent) alternative 
existed.
85
  Concerning this aspect the Panel pointed out the option of negotiating 
international cooperative arrangements, which would seem to be desirable in view of 
the fact that dolphins roam the waters of many states and the high seas.
86
   
 
Examining Article XX (g), the Panel confirmed the finding in Fish Export Ban, namely 
that a measure could be considered as “relating to the conservation of exhaustible 
natural resources” within the meaning of Article XX (g) only if it was primarily aimed 
at such conservation.
87
  The Panel recalled that the United States linked the maximum 
incidental dolphin-taking rate that Mexico had to meet to the taking rate actually 
recorded for United States fishermen, and found that a limitation on trade based on such 
unpredictable conditions could not be regarded as being “primarily aimed” at the 




These findings by the Panel, in terms of which the “environmental” provisions of the 
GATT were interpreted very narrowly, raised a lot of criticism.
89
 It is significant, 
however, that the Panel did find positively in favour of eco-labelling. 
 
The United States’ Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act90(“The DPCIA”) 
set standards relating to labelling tuna as “dolphin friendly” and criminalised any false 
or misleading labelling.  Mexico argued that this requirement discriminated against 
Mexico as a country fishing in the ETP, based on the MFN requirement of Article I: 
1.  The Panel, however, found that the labelling provisions of the DPCIA relating to 
                                                 
85
 Ibid paragraphs 3.33 and 5.27 – 5.28. 
86
 Ibid paragraph 5.28. 
87




 See Matsushita, Schoenbaum and Mavroidis op.cit 448 n 27.  See also Gaines, S., “The WTO’s 
Reading of the GATT Article XX Chapeau:  A Disguised Restriction on Environmental Measures” 
2001 (22(4)) University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 739 at 755 where it is 
commented that Tuna-Dolphin I not only gave the idea that Article XX did not allow scope for 
unilateral trade measures to protect the environment, but also raised doubts about whether it would 
cover multilateral agreements that impose trade restrictions as core elements of their environmental 
protection strategies, such as CITES, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer, and the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes 
and Their Disposal. 
90
 Ibid paragraph 2.12. 
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tuna caught in the ETP were not inconsistent with this Article as they did not restrict 
the sale of tuna products as such, and were applied without distinction between 




A second Panel was thereafter called upon by different complainants than in Tuna 
Dolphin I to examine basically the same issue. 
 
 
4.1.5 United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna 92 (“Tuna-Dolphin II”) 
 
The facts of this case are similar to the ones described above in Tuna-Dolphin 1.  The 
EEC and the Netherlands (on behalf of the Netherlands Antilles) complained that both 
the primary and the intermediary nation embargoes, enforced pursuant to the MMPA, 
did not fall under Article III, were inconsistent with Article XI:1, and were not 
covered by any of the exceptions of Article XX.
93
  The United States argued that the 
intermediary nation embargo was consistent with the GATT since it was covered by 




The first significant change in direction from Tuna Dolphin I was that, on Article XX 
(b) and (g), the Panel found that there was no basis for the contention that Article XX 
applied only to policies related to the protection of human, animal or plant life and 
health or to the conservation of natural resources located within the territory of the 
contracting party,
95
 and concluded that the policy pursued within the jurisdiction over 
its nationals and vessels, fell within the range of policies covered by Article XX (b) 
and (g).
96
  In other words, it was found that national measures could also be applied 
extra-territorially. 
 
Although permissive on the “extraterritoriality issue”, the Panel found that measures 
taken so as to force other countries to change their policies could not be considered 
                                                 
91
 Ibid paragraphs 25.42-5.44. 
92
 DS29/R (EU Complaint) Panel Report not adopted but circulated in 1994. 
93
 Ibid paragraphs 3.3 to 3.4. 
94
 Ibid paragraph 3.7. 
95
 Ibid paragraphs 5.16-5.17, and 5.32. 
96
 Ibid paragraphs 5.20 and 5.33. 
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"necessary" for the protection of animal life or health in the sense of Article XX (b),
97
 
or primarily aimed at the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, or at rendering 
effective restrictions on domestic production or consumption, in the meaning of 
Article XX (g).
98
   
Concerning Article XX (d), the Panel found that since the primary nation embargo 
was inconsistent with Article XI: 1, it could not serve as a basis for the justification of 




The two Tuna Dolphin cases constituted the first time that the GATT Panels really 
had to come to terms with protection of the environment.
100
  Although they were 
never adopted and could not set a precedent for subsequent Panels,
101
 reaction was 
far-reaching and cut across several disciplines, putting the WTO firmly at the front of 
International Law and popular consciousness of globalisation, and eventually 




4.1.6 United States – Taxes on Automobiles103 
 
In this case, three US measures on automobiles were under examination:  the luxury 
tax on automobiles ("luxury tax"), the gas consumption tax on automobiles ("gas 
guzzler"), and the Corporate Average Fuel Economy regulation ("CAFE").
104
  The 
European Communities argued that these measures were inconsistent with Article III 
and could not be justified under Article XX (g) or (d).
105
   
 
The Panel found that both the luxury tax and the gas-guzzler tax were consistent with 
Article III: 2.  However, it found the CAFE regulation (which required the average 
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fuel economy for passenger cars manufactured in the US or sold by any importer not 
to fall below 27.5 miles per gallon
106
) to be inconsistent with Article III: 4, as the 
separate foreign fleet accounting discriminated against foreign cars and the fleet 
averaging differentiated between imported and domestic cars on the basis of factors 
relating to control or ownership of producers or importers (i.e. based on origin), rather 




The Panel found that a policy to conserve gasoline was within the range of policies 
covered by Article XX (g), mainly because gasoline is produced from petroleum, 
which is an exhaustible natural resource.
108
  However, the Panel further found that the 
separate foreign fleet accounting was not justified under Article XX (g) because the 
measure did not contribute directly to fuel conservation in the US.  In other words, a 
measure that did not further the objectives of conservation of an exhaustible resource 
could not be deemed to be primarily aimed at such conservation.
109
   
 
4.2 Cases dealt with under the WTO and GATT 1994 
 
In contrast to the decisions discussed above, a reading of the decisions referred to 
below makes it clear that “…the WTO Appellate Body is fashioning its own approach 
to Article XX that makes significantly greater allowance for legitimate measures of 
environmental protection”.110   
 
4.2.1 United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline 111 
 
On 23 January 1995, days after the WTO and its new dispute settlement procedure 
came into being, Venezuela requested consultations as it contended that the US was 
applying rules that discriminated against gasoline imports by imposing stricter criteria 
                                                 
106
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than demanded of domestic fuel.  A couple of months later, the matter was referred to 
the dispute resolution Panel of the WTO. 
 
In accordance with a 1990 amendment to the United States’ Clean Air Act, the US 
Environmental Protection Agency (“the EPA”) promulgated the Gasoline Rule on the 
composition and emissions effects of gasoline, in order to reduce air pollution in the 
US and to ensure that pollution from the combustion of gasoline did not exceed 1990 
levels.
112
   
 
From 1 January 1995, the Gasoline Rule permitted only gasoline of a specified 
cleanliness ("reformulated gasoline") to be sold to consumers in the most polluted 
areas of the country.  In the rest of the country, only gasoline no dirtier than that sold 
in the base year of 1990 ("conventional gasoline") could be sold.
113
  The Gasoline 
Rule applied to all US refiners, blenders and importers of gasoline. The EPA 
regulation provided two different sets of baseline emissions standards, with a stricter 




Upon the complaint by Venezuela and Brazil, the Panel found that imported and 
domestic gasoline were “like products”, and that since, under the baseline 
establishment methods, imported gasoline was effectively prevented from benefiting 
from sales conditions as favourable as domestic gasoline were afforded by an 
individual baseline tied to the producer of a product, imported gasoline was treated 
less favourably than domestic gasoline.
115
  The baseline establishment rules of the 




The Panel agreed with the parties that a policy to reduce air pollution resulting from 
the consumption of gasoline was a policy concerning the protection of human, animal 
and plant life or health mentioned in Article XX (b).
117
  However, the Panel found that 
the baseline establishment methods were not “necessary” under Article XX (b) since 
                                                 
112
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 Ibid paragraph 6.21. 
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there were other consistent or less inconsistent measures reasonably available to the 
US for the same policy objective.
118
  In so finding, it followed the narrow 
interpretation favoured by the GATT 1947 Panels discussed above. 
 
Finally, the Panel considered that a policy to reduce the depletion of clean air was, 
indeed, a policy to conserve a natural resource within the meaning of Article XX 
(g).
119
  However, the Panel found that the less favourable baseline establishment 
methods at issue in this case were not primarily aimed at
120
 the conservation of 
natural resources and could therefore not be justified under Article XX (g) as a 
measure “relating to” the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.121   
 
The Panel concluded that the Gasoline Rule could not be justified under Article XX 
(b), (d) or (g).  In light of these findings, it was not deemed necessary by the Panel to 
determine whether the measure met the conditions set out in the chapeau of Article 
XX.
122
   
 
The United States appealed the Panel report but limited its appeal to the Panel's 




Findings by the Appellate Body 
 
The Appellate Body referred to the general rule of treaty interpretation contained in 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which states that “[a] 
treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose”124 and concluded that the phrase “primarily aimed at” is “not itself treaty 
language and was not designed as a simple litmus test for inclusion or exclusion from 
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Article XX(g)”.125  The Appellate Body agreed with the Panel that the words “relating 
to” contained in Article XX (g) should be interpreted as meaning “primarily aimed at” 
the conservation of natural resources,
126
 but disagreed with the Panel’s view that the 
establishment rules were not primarily aimed at the conservation of natural 
resources.
127
   
 
The Appellate Body then considered whether the measures were “made effective in 
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption”,128 the second 
condition contained in Article XX (g).   The Appellate Body found that  
 
“[w]e believe that the clause … is appropriately read as a requirement that 
the measures concerned impose restrictions, not just in respect of imported 
gasoline but also with respect to domestic gasoline.  The clause is a 
requirement of even-handedness in the imposition of restrictions, in the 
name of conservation, upon the production or consumption of exhaustible 
natural resources.”129 
 
The Appellate Body also stated that:  
“[t]he baseline establishment rules affect both domestic gasoline and 
imported gasoline…Thus, restrictions on the consumption or depletion of 
clean air by regulating the domestic production of "dirty" gasoline are 
established jointly with corresponding restrictions with respect to 
imported gasoline.  That imported gasoline has been determined to have 
been accorded "less favourable treatment" than the domestic gasoline in 
terms of Article III: 4, is not material for purposes of analysis under 
Article XX (g).”130 
 
The Appellate Body therefore clearly found that the baseline establishment rules 
contained in the Gasoline Rule fell within the scope of Article XX (g), and in so 
doing, it widened the scope of Article significantly. 
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The Appellate Body went on to find that the measures under scrutiny failed to meet 
the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX.  It noted that the chapeau addressed 
not so much the questioned measure or its specific contents as such, but rather the 
manner in which that measure is applied.  Accordingly, the chapeau is animated by the 
principle that while members have a legal right to invoke the exceptions of 
Article XX, they should not be so applied as to “…frustrate or defeat the legal 
obligations of the holder of the right under the substantive rules of the General 
Agreement”.131 
 
It concluded that the application of the US regulation amounted to unjustifiable 
discrimination and to a disguised restriction on trade because of two omissions on the 
part of the United States.
132
  First, the United States had not adequately explored 
means, including in particular cooperation with Venezuela and Brazil, of mitigating the 
administrative problems that led the United States to reject individual baselines for 
foreign refiners.  Second, the United States did not count the costs for foreign refiners 
that would result from the imposition of statutory baselines.  The resulting 
discrimination must therefore have been foreseen, and was not merely inadvertent or 
unavoidable.   
 
The Reformulated Gasoline report placed Article XX in a new light.  As one 
commentator put it:   
“Future Article XX cases, it now appeared, would not turn on whether the 
trade measure addressed and environmental issue covered by Article XX (b) 
or (g) (“Tuna Dolphin I”), or even whether the effect of the measure on 
environmental quality was direct or indirect (“Tuna-Dolphin II”).  The 
major issue would become whether the challenged government had applied 
a measure within the scope of (b) or (g) in a way that resulted in ‘arbitrary 
or unjustifiable discrimination’ contrary to the conditions in the chapeau to 
Article XX.”133 
In the next environmental case adjudicated by the WTO dispute resolution body, we 
find that protection of the environment was given even more prominence. 
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4.2.2 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
 Products
134
 (“Shrimp-Turtle I”) 
 
Certain endangered sea turtles are characterised as highly migratory species, and as 
such they have been adversely affected by human activity, either directly (exploitation 
of their meat, shells and eggs), or indirectly (incidental capture in fisheries, 
destruction of their habitats, pollution of the oceans).  In 1998, all species of sea 




Accordingly, the US Endangered Species Act of 1973 (“the ESA”) lists as endangered 
or threatened the five species of sea turtles found in US waters and prohibits their take 
within the United States, within the US territorial sea and the high seas.  Pursuant to 
the ESA, the United States required that shrimp trawlers used "turtle excluder 
devices" (“TEDs”) in their nets when fishing in areas where there was a significant 
likelihood of encountering sea turtles. 
 
Section 609 of the United States’ Public Law 101-162 (hereafter "Section 609"), 
enacted in 1989 by the United States, was intended to, inter alia, develop bilateral or 
multilateral agreements for the protection and conservation of sea turtles.  Section 609 
prohibited the importation into the United States of shrimp harvested with technology 
that might adversely affect certain sea turtles, unless the harvesting nation was 
certified to have a regulatory programme for the conservation of sea turtles and an 
incidental take rate comparable to that of the United States, or that the particular 
fishing environment of the harvesting nation did not pose a threat to sea turtles.     
 
India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand charged that the United States’ regulations 




 and XIII: 1, 
because it restricted the importation of shrimp and shrimp products from countries 
which had not been certified, while like products from other countries which had been 
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certified could be imported freely into the US.
138
  The US claimed that the measures 
at issue were justified under Article XX (b) and (g), because these provisions did not 
contain jurisdictional limitations, nor limitations on the location of the animals or 
natural resources to be protected and conserved.
139
  The complainants argued to the 
contrary that Article XX (b) and (g) could not be invoked to justify a measure 
applying to animals outside the jurisdiction of the Member enacting the measure. 
 
The Panel found that the ban imposed by the United States was inconsistent with 
Article XI (General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions),
140
 and found that the 
US ban could not be justified under Article XX as it constituted unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail and thus was not 
within the scope of measures permitted under Article XX.
141
   The Panel therefore 
started off its analysis with the chapeau to Article XX, and since it had found that the 
measure under scrutiny did not pass the test posed therein, it did not find it necessary 
to examine whether the US measure was covered by paragraphs (b) and (g) of Article 
XX.
142
   
 
 
Findings by the Appellate Body 
 
On appeal, the US raised, inter alia, the issue of whether the Panel erred in finding 
that the measure at issue constituted unjustifiable discrimination between countries 
where the same conditions prevail and, thus, was not within the scope of measures 




The Appellate Body rejected the methodology followed by the Panel in first 
considering the chapeau of Article XX before moving on to its sub-articles and 
instead invoked the two-tiered analysis as first established in Reformulated Gasoline.  
It went so far as to indicate that the sequence of steps followed in Reformulated 
Gasoline (first, characterization of the measure under Article XX (g);  second, further 
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appraisal of the same measure under the introductory clauses of Article XX) reflected 
not inadvertence or random choice, but rather the fundamental structure and logic of 
Article XX.
144
   
 
India, Pakistan and Thailand argued that if “all” natural resources were considered to 
be exhaustible, the term “exhaustible” itself would become superfluous.  Malaysia 
contended that “living creatures” should be interpreted as falling within the scope of 
Article XX (b) and “nonliving exhaustible natural resources” within the exemption 
contained within Article XX (g) and that therefore paragraphs (b) and (g) of Article 




The Appellate Body distinctly recognised the evolving importance of environmental 
protection by contrasting the preambles to both the WTO agreement and its 
“predecessor”, the GATT.146  It also noted that a number of international agreements 
and other important documents, such as the 1992 Convention on Biological 
Diversity
147
 and Agenda 21,
148




The report notes: 
“[O] ne lesson that modern biological sciences teach us is that living 
species, though in principle, capable of reproduction and, in that sense, 
‘renewable’, are in certain circumstances indeed susceptible of 
depletion, exhaustion and extinction, frequently because of human 
activities.”150 
 
The Appellate Body therefore found that the sea turtles involved constituted 
"exhaustible natural resources" for purposes of Article XX (g),
151
 and that Section 609 
was a measure "relating to" the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource,
152
 as 
Section 609, cum implementing guidelines, was not disproportionately wide in its 
scope and reach in relation to the policy objective of protection and conservation of 
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Having categorised the measure as qualifying under Article XX (g), the Appellate 
Body proceeded to examine it under the conditions stated in the chapeau.  First off, it 
examined the reasoning behind the inclusion of the chapeau into the GATT 1994, and 
the general context of the Article, and stated the following: 
“The chapeau of Article XX is, in fact, but one expression of the principle 
of good faith.  This principle, at once a general principle of law and a 
general principle of international law, controls the exercise of rights by 
states.  One application of this general principle, the application widely 
known as the doctrine of  abus de droit, prohibits the abusive exercise of a 
state's rights and enjoins that whenever the assertion of a right impinges 
on the field covered by [a] treaty obligation, it must be exercised bona 
fide, that is to say, reasonably… An abusive exercise by a Member of its 
own treaty right thus results in a breach of the treaty rights of the other 
Members and, as well, a violation of the treaty obligation of the Member 
so acting.”154 
 
Having already included other rules of international law, further placing the WTO 
regime and its constituting agreements within the framework of a wider, inter-related 
“system” of international law, is a significant change from previous disputes where a 
narrow focus on GATT rules in isolation were evident. 
 
The Appellate Body found that the task of interpreting and applying the chapeau is 
essentially one of locating and marking out a line of equilibrium between the right of 
a Member to invoke an exception under Article XX and the rights of the other 
Members under varying substantive provisions (e.g., Article XI) of the GATT 1994, 
so that neither of the competing rights will cancel out the other and thereby distort and 
nullify or impair the balance of rights and obligations constructed by the Members 
themselves in that Agreement.
155
 It noted that the application of a measure may be 
characterised as amounting to an abuse or misuse of an exception of Article XX not 
only when the detailed operating provisions of the measure prescribe the arbitrary or 
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unjustifiable activity, but also where a measure, otherwise fair and just on its face, is 




The Appellate Body stated that discrimination resulted, not only when countries in 
which the same conditions prevail were treated differently, but also when the 
application of the measure at issue did not allow for any inquiry into the 
appropriateness of the regulatory programme for the conditions prevailing in the 
exporting countries.
157
  Thereby, the failure of the United States to engage the 
appellees, as well as other Members exporting shrimp to the United States, in serious, 
across-the-board negotiations with the objective of concluding bilateral or multilateral 
agreements for the protection and conservation of sea turtles, before unilaterally 
enforcing the import prohibition against the shrimp exports of those Members, was 
also taken into account.
158
  Tellingly, the Appellate Body stated: 
“Perhaps the most conspicuous flaw in this measure's application relates 
to its intended and actual coercive effect on the specific policy decisions 
made by foreign governments, Members of the WTO.”159  
 
The Appellate Body found that the United States negotiated seriously with some, but 
not with other WTO members that export shrimp to the United States.  The effect was 
plainly discriminatory and, in the opinion of the Appellate Body, unjustifiable.
160
    As 
it is stated on the WTO website:   
“The US lost the case, not because it sought to protect the environment 
but because it discriminated between WTO members.  It provided 
countries in the western hemisphere – mainly in the Caribbean – 
technical and financial assistance and longer transition periods for their 
fishermen to start using turtle-excluder devices.  It did not give the same 
advantage, however, to the four Asian countries (India, Malaysia, 
Pakistan and Thailand) that filed the complaint with the WTO.”161 
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4.2.3 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products: 
 Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia 
162
  (“Shrimp-Turtle II”) 
 
A few years after the Appellate Body Report in Shrimp-Turtle I discussed above, and 
in accordance with Article 21.5 of the DSU,
163
 Malaysia requested that the DSB refer 
to a Panel its complaint with respect to whether the United States had complied with 
the recommendations and rulings of the DSB handed down in that case, which were 
adopted on 6 November 1998.  The DSB referred the matter to the original Panel. 
 
Findings by the Panel 
 
In order to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB, the United States 
issued the Revised Guidelines for the Implementation of Section 609 of Public Law 
101-162 Relating to the Protection of Sea Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations 
(the “Revised Guidelines”).164  These Revised Guidelines replaced the guidelines 
issued in April 1996 that were part of the original measure at stake.  The Revised 
Guidelines set forth criteria for certification.  
 
The Panel noted that in Shrimp-Turtle 1, the Appellate Body concluded that Section 
609 was provisionally justified under Article XX (g).  Therefore, since the 
implementing measure before the Panel was identical to the measure examined by the 
Appellate Body in relation to paragraph (g), the Panel likewise held that the 
implementing measure was provisionally justifiable under Article XX (g).
165
   
 
The Panel then reiterated the Appellate Body's finding in Shrimp-Turtle 1 concerning 
the nature of the chapeau of Article XX, namely that the task of interpreting and 
applying the chapeau essentially entails the delicate one of locating and marking out a 
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line of equilibrium between the right of a member to invoke an exception under 
Article XX and the rights of the other members under varying substantive provisions 
of the GATT 1994. 
  
The Panel concluded that the recognition that the protection of migratory species was 
best achieved through international cooperation significantly moved the line of 
equilibrium towards a bilaterally or multilaterally negotiated solution, thus rendering 
recourse to unilateral measures less acceptable.
166
  On this basis, the Panel proceeded 
to determine whether the line of equilibrium in the field of sea turtle conservation and 
protection was such as to require the conclusion of an international agreement or only 
“efforts to negotiate”, and found that the obligation of the United States was an 
obligation to negotiate, as opposed to an obligation to conclude an international 
agreement.  It also concluded that the US had made serious good faith efforts to 




Findings of the Appellate Body 
 
Malaysia appealed against this decision, arguing that the US should have concluded 
an international agreement on the protection and conservation of sea turtles before 
imposing an import prohibition.
168
  The Appellate Body upheld the Panel's finding 
and rejected Malaysia's contention that avoiding "arbitrary and unjustifiable 
discrimination" under the chapeau of Article XX required the conclusion of an 
international agreement on the protection and conservation of sea turtles.
169
   
 
Malaysia also argued that the measure at issue resulted in "arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination" because of the lack of flexibility of the US measure.  The Appellate 
Body upheld again the Panel's finding and agreed with the reasoning of the Panel that 
conditioning market access on the adoption of a programme comparable in 
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effectiveness, (as opposed to conditioning market access on the adoption of essentially 
the same programme) allowed for sufficient flexibility in the application of the 




This part of the decision in Shrimp-Turtle has drawn the most praise from 
commentators because of its “new-found” sensitivity to environmental considerations 
and reliance on sources of public international law outside the WTO.
171
  Some 
commentators, however, argue that this is not enough, and that Shrimp-Turtle 
continues the “tradition” of trade jurisprudence that “has almost completely closed off 
the policy space Article XX should leave open for national trade measures designed to 
protect the environment”.172 
 
Nevertheless, in the next matter before the DSB, further progress was made in the 
trade-versus-environment polemic. 
 





A dispute arose between Canada and France over French decree No. 96-1133 of 24 
December 1996 (“the Decree”), banning  
“[t]he manufacture, processing, sale, import, placing on the domestic 
market and transfer under any title whatsoever of all varieties of 
asbestos fibres…regardless of whether these substances have been 
incorporated into materials, products or devices.”174 
 
Canada claimed that the decree was inconsistent with a number of obligations of the  
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A threshold question confronting the Panel was whether to analyse the decree under 
Article XI, as argued by Canada, or Article III, as argued by the EC.
176
   The Panel 
agreed with the EC and tested the decree under Article III: 4, which channelled the 
Panel’s analysis towards the national treatment standard.  This in turn tested whether 
Canadian asbestos was being treated less favourably than “like products” produced in 
France.
177
  The Panel found that chrysotile-fibre products and fibro-cement products 
were, indeed, “like products” with the meaning of Article III: 4.178  The Panel further 
found that the provisions of the decree relating to the prohibiting of the marketing of 
chrysotile fibres and chrysotile-cement products violated Article III: 4.   
 
Nevertheless, the Panel decided that the violation of Article III: 4 was justified under 
Article XX (b),
179
 and that the measure did not conflict with the chapeau of Article 
XX,
180
 as the application of the Decree did not constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination,
181








 the following relevant issues were raised:
184
  
(a) Whether the Panel erred in its interpretation and application of the term "like 
products" in Article III: 4 in finding that chrysotile asbestos fibres are "like" 
PVA, cellulose and glass fibres, and in finding that cement-based products 
containing chrysotile asbestos fibres are "like" cement-based products 
containing polyvinyl alcohol, cellulose and glass fibres; and 
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and, therefore, that a prohibition of chrysotile asbestos fell within the range of policies designed to 
protect human life or health. 
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(b) Whether the Panel erred in finding that the measure at issue is necessary to 
protect human life or health under Article XX (b) of the GATT 1994.  
 
The Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s finding that white asbestos is “like” PCG 
fibres.
185
  The Body confirmed that “like” products under Article III: 4 have a variable 
meaning, and should be assessed on a case-by-case basis
186
.  No evidence, including a 
possible risk to health, should be excluded from the “like” product analysis, and 
therefore the Panel had erred by not taking into account the carcinogenic nature of 
white asbestos in its examination of the products’ physical properties.187  
 
The Appellate Body noted that WTO members have an undisputed right to determine 
the appropriate level of health protection in a given situation,
188
 and therefore rejected 
Canada's arguments against the necessity of the measure.  In order to evaluate whether 
the measure was necessary, the Appellate Body mentioned the interpretation of 
“necessity” formulated in Thailand - Cigarettes, namely whether there was an 
alternative GATT-consistent, or less inconsistent measure, which a Member could 
reasonably be expected to employ.
189
  Based on evidence before the Panel that raised 
doubts as to the efficacy of measures prescribing controlled use of asbestos, the 
Appellate Body concluded that ‘controlled use’ was not a reasonably available 





Although the Appellate Body used the same terminology as in Thailand: Cigarettes, 
the scope of Article XX (b) namely “reasonably available alternative”, the test for 
whether another measure is, indeed, reasonable was formulated much wider.  The 
Appellate Body stated that a weighing and balancing process must be followed by 
which it is evaluated whether a WTO-consistent alternative measure is “reasonably 
                                                 
185
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available” is the extent to which the alternative measure "contributes to the realization 










From the case law discussed supra it seems as if environmental awareness and the 
concomitant willingness to accommodate environmental concerns in trade-related 
disputes are gaining some ground among the Panels of the WTO.  This becomes 
apparent when one compares the findings in disputes adjudicated under GATT 1947 
with those under GATT 1994.  In this section, the progress made in the interpretation 
and application of Article XX through the cases discussed above will be briefly 
summarised before moving on to other areas of concern in the trade-environment 
debate. 
 
5.2 Article XX revisited  
 
A parallel movement can be discerned in the “environmental” cases submitted for 
dispute resolution before GATT 1947 and WTO dispute resolution bodies:  Firstly, 
the kind of cases have moved from those attempting to use the Article XX exception 
to disguise protectionism or retaliation
192
 to instances where environmental concerns 
really did constitute the rationale for a specific trade measure.
193
  Secondly, since the 
inception of the WTO and its revised dispute resolution procedure, there has been a 
marked widening of scope when interpreting the Article XX exceptions.  The main 
areas of progress are briefly summarised below. 
 
5.2.1 Article XX (b): “Necessary” 
 
                                                 
191
 Ibid paragraph 172. 
192
 Such as the Tuna Import Ban, Fish Export Ban and Thailand: Cigarettes cases. 
193
 From Tuna Dolphin onward, all the cases discussed here have been primarily aimed at 
environmental protection in some or other manner. 
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In Thailand: Cigarettes the test whether a trade measure was “necessary” in order to 
protect human, animal or plant life was formulated as follows:  If there is no 
alternative measure consistent with the GATT, or less inconsistent with it, which 
could reasonably be employed to achieve the policy objective, then the measure could 
not be regarded as “necessary”.194  In essence, the same was decided in the Tuna 
Dolphin disputes where the United States’ interpretation of “necessary” was 
rejected,
195
 as well as in Reformulated Gasoline, the first environmental measure 
decided under the WTO.
196
  A change in the way this test is applied came in Asbestos 
where a “balancing approach” was introduced, whereby the question is not merely 
whether there are GATT consistent or least inconsistent alternative measures, but also 





5.2.2 Article XX (g): “Exhaustible natural resources” 
 
A debate ensued as to whether or not the phrase “exhaustible natural resource” 
contained in Article XX (g) should be understood as referring to non-living finite 
resources, such as oil and coal only.   
 
In both the Tuna Import Ban and Fish Export cases discussed above, it was agreed 
between the parties to the dispute (being the United States and Canada in both 
instances) that fish such as tuna, salmon and herring could be regarded as “exhaustible 
natural resources”, and therefore there was no need for the respective Panels to 
interpret this phrase. 
 
However, in Tuna-Dolphin I, Mexico argued that the term “exhaustible natural 
resources” could not be justifiably extended to include “fisheries and fishery products, 
nor in fact any living being” (emphasis added).  It further argued that living beings 
could reproduce themselves and could therefore not fall within the definition of 
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“exhaustible”. 198  Unfortunately the Panel did not deem it necessary to address this 
issue. 
 
In Reformulated Gasoline and Shrimp-Turtle 1, both the Panel and the Appellate 
Body agreed with the broad interpretation of Article XX (g) put forward by the United 
States.  In Reformulated Gasoline, for example, the Panel made the points that, firstly, 
clean air is a “resource”, secondly, that such a resource is “natural” and thirdly, that it 
could be depleted.
199
  The Appellate Body in Shrimp-Turtle I noted: 
“The words of Article XX (g), ‘exhaustible natural resources’, were 
actually crafted more than 50 years ago.  They must be read by a treaty 
interpreter in the light of contemporary concerns of the community of 
nations about the protection and conservation of the 
environment…From the perspective embodied in the preamble of the 
WTO Agreement, we note that the generic term ‘natural resources’ in 
Article XX (g) is not ‘static’ in its content or reference but is rather, by 
definition, evolutionary.”200  
 
5.2.3 Article XX (g): “relating to”  
 
Although a trade measure does not have to be “necessary”, (as required in Article XX 
(b)) to natural resource conservation, the GATT/WTO dispute resolution bodies have 
interpreted the words “relating to” to mean “primarily aimed at” conservation.201  
Phrased like this, it constitutes a difficult obstacle, and seeing as the terms “relating 
to” and “primarily aimed at” are not synonyms, it also seems unfairly burdensome.  
The Appellate Body itself pointed out in Reformulated Gasoline that the phrase 
“primarily aimed at” is not itself treaty language, and was not designed as a litmus test 
for Article XX.
202





5.2.4 The chapeau to Article XX 
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As pointed out above, there are three benchmarks that an environmental measure must 
clear under the chapeau, namely that of arbitrary discrimination, unjustifiable 
discrimination, and a disguised restriction on international trade. 
 
In Tuna-Dolphin I the Panel ruled in favour of Mexico on the grounds that the 
embargo was inconsistent with GATT obligations because the use of trade measures 
to protect the environment outside a nation’s sovereign territory was not permitted 
under the Agreement.  In contrast, the Panel modified its position in Tuna-Dolphin II, 
and recognised that, for Article XX (g) purposes, the United States action was a 
policy to conserve exhaustible natural resources.  This mixed reading of Article XX of 
the GATT provided the foundation for the WTO Dispute Resolution Panel’s 
subsequent interpretations of similar cases. 
 
In 1992 the GATT Secretariat stated, concerning Article XX: “GATT rules…place 
essentially no constraints on a country’s right to protect its own environment against 
damage from either domestic production or the consumption of domestically 
produced or imported products.”203  However, despite this seeming strength that the 
WTO’s promoters promised the Article XX exceptions would have, the chapeau to the 
Article provides the greatest hurdle for environmental measures challenged before the 
WTO.  The language of the chapeau itself gives no indication as to what would 
constitute “arbitrary” or “unjustified” discrimination.  This led some commentators to 
note that, therefore, “the standard is what the Appellate Body says it is.”204   
 
The decisions in both Shrimp Turtle I and Shrimp Turtle II, however, demonstrated 
that overcoming the conditions set in the chapeau is not impossible.  As a matter of 
fact, all it seemed to entail was adherence to the universally accepted natural law 
requirement of good faith.  When the United States engaged in multilateral 
negotiations with the complainants (instead of imposing its measure unilaterally and 
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without consultations) the Appellate Body in Shrimp Turtle II found that it had met 




5.2.5 The extra-jurisdictional issue 
 
The GATT Panels in the two Tuna Dolphin cases came to different conclusions 
regarding the territorial application of Article XX (b) and (g).  The Panel for Tuna 
Dolphin I found that protection was accorded only to those things and beings found 
within the jurisdiction of the country concerned.
206
  The Tuna Dolphin II Panel found 




In Shrimp-Turtle I, however, the Appellate Body gave clear extra-territorial scope to 
article XX (g):  It applies without distinction to exhaustible resources beyond areas of 




From an analysis of the cases it is therefore clear that, as far as the interpretation of 
Article XX is concerned, the DSB have increasingly shown a willingness to 
accommodate environmental concerns, especially when compared to GATT 1947 
rulings.  As some commentators put it: 
“The approach…now mandated by the Appellate Body is substantially 
different from the restrictive and somewhat illogical interpretations of 
GATT Panels, particularly the Tuna Dolphin decisions.  In fact, the US 
restrictions on the harvesting of tuna would now pass Article XX (g) with 
flying colours.”209 
 
There is only so much the DSB can do, however.  Even though it may be very 
accommodating towards environmental concerns, it is still bound by the treaty regime 
it serves.  Against this background other areas impacting on the environment/trade 
debate relating to the WTO will now be briefly examined. 
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5.3 Committee on Trade and Environment   
 
As stated, the initial aim of the GATT was mainly focused on the liberalisation of 
international trade.   It is only within the last three decades that the importance of 
international environmental regulation had been recognised.
210
  At its conception, the 
GATT gave little if any consideration to environmental concerns.  The preamble to 
the 1947 GATT declares that states should conduct “their relations in the field of trade 
and economic endeavour…with a view to…developing the full use of the resources of 
the world”.  Compare this with the language of the 1994 WTO Agreement preamble, 
which exhorts Contracting Parties to “allow…for the optimal use of the world’s 
resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both 
to protect and preserve the environment”.211    
 
In addition, the GATT Council had established a Working Group on Environmental 
Measures and International Trade in 1971,
212
 but, as some commentators pointed out, 




Increased cognisance of the environment, especially in the wake of the Tuna Dolphin 
disputes, was not restricted to the constituting documents of the world’s foremost 
trade-related institution.  Aside from the WTO itself, another offshoot of the Uruguay 
Round was the creation of the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment (“CTE”).   
This Committee’s mandate was to address, amongst others, the following matters: 
1. “the relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading 
system and trade measures for environmental purposes, including those 
pursuant to multilateral environmental agreements”; 
2. “the relationship between environmental policies relevant to trade and 
environmental measures with significant trade effects and the provisions 
of the multilateral trading system”; 
3. “the relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading 
system and (a) charges and taxes for environmental purposes (b) 
requirements for environmental purposes relating to products, including 
standards and technical regulations, packaging, labelling and recycling”; 
                                                 
210
 French, D., “The Changing Nature of ‘Environmental Protection’: Recent Developments Regarding 
Trade and the Environment in the European Union and the World Trade Organisation” 2000 (47) 
Netherlands International Law Review 4. 
211
 Emphasis added. 
212
 Decision of the GATT Contracting Parties C/M/71 1971. 
213




4. “the provisions of the multilateral trading system with respect to the 
transparency of trade measures used for environmental purposes and 
environmental measures and requirements which have significant trade 
effects”; 
5. “the relationship between the dispute settlement mechanisms in the 
multilateral trading system and those found in multilateral 
environmental agreements”; 
6. “the effect of environmental measures on market access, especially in 
relation to developing countries, in particular to the least developed 
among them, and environmental benefits of removing trade restrictions 
and distortions”; 
7. “the issue of exports of domestically prohibited goods”; 
8. …; 
9. “the work programme envisaged in Decision on Trade in Services and 
the Environment”; and 
10. “input to the relevant bodies in respect of appropriate arrangements for 
relations with inter-governmental and non-governmental 
organizations”.214 
 
The CTE therefore mainly came into existence as a result of a decision to formulate a 
more international approach to environmental problems.  It has been commented that 
there has been little progress in the CTE on the environmental issues it was tasked to 
address.  There are deep divisions between the most economically developed 
members such as the European Union (“the EU”) and the US, who support 
introducing environmental measures more explicitly into trade agreements, and the 
majority of developing member states, who see this as a cover for discrimination 
against their products.
215
  Therefore, resorting to the CTE as a source of hope for 
environmentalists may prove to be futile.  However, and it is suggested, because of 
this,
216
 a work programme on Trade and Environment was adopted at the Doha 




5.4 Doha Trade and Environment Work Programme 
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In November 2001 the Doha Ministerial Conference included a Trade and 
Environment Work Programme in its Ministerial Declaration.
217
  With a view to 
enhancing the “mutual supportiveness of trade and environment”, the following items 
for negotiation were identified: 
“(i) the relationship between existing WTO rules and specific trade 
obligations set out in multilateral environmental agreements 
(MEAs)…  ; 
(ii) procedures for regular information exchange between MEA 
Secretariats and the relevant WTO committees, and the criteria for 
the granting of observer status;” and 
“(iii) the reduction or, as appropriate, elimination of tariff and non-tariff 
barriers to environmental goods and services.”218 
 
Furthermore, the CTE was instructed to give particular attention to the effect of 
environmental measures on market access.
219
  The importance of technical assistance 
and capacity building in the field of trade and environment to developing countries 
was recognised, and sharing of expertise and experience with Members wishing to 
perform environmental reviews at the national level was encouraged.
220
   
 
These developments augur well for those who wish to see environmental concerns 
elevated, but also serve to highlight the fact that the accommodation of the 




5.5  Problems with enforcement of dispute rulings 
 
It has been argued above that the dispute settlement procedure followed by the WTO 
is theoretically far more effective than that of the GATT.  Rulings are binding, and 
compensation could be provided in cases of non-compliance. Compensation, 
however, must be agreed upon.  In the final instance, if compensation could not be 
agreed upon, non-compliance could be met by retaliatory measures.  However, it is 
highly questionable whether countries would be keen to attempt enforcing rulings 
through retaliation, simply because the economic effects which inevitably accompany 
                                                 
217
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trade barriers would probably not make it worth their while.
222
  For many export-
dependent countries, the withdrawal of concessions is simply not an option. 
 
A related problem is the seeming inability of the WTO to attain the compliance of 
superpower nations.  The Tuna-Dolphin rulings, for example, which created such a 
furore, were effectively ignored by the United States.
223
  The more powerful nations 
successfully ignore DSB rulings, the less confidence the global community as a whole 
will have in the ability of the WTO dispute resolution procedure to provide consistent 
and reliable outcomes. 
 
5.6 The precautionary principle   
 
A further indication of the seemingly more accommodating attitude towards 
environment-based trade restrictions can be found in the application of the so-called 
“precautionary principle”.  Article 15 of the Rio Declaration224 defines the 
precautionary principle as follows:   
“In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be 
widely applied by States according to their capabilities.  Where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to 
prevent environmental degradation.”225  
 
In short, the precautionary principle states that even in cases of scientific uncertainty, 
when the environmental risks are predicted but not provable in scientific terms, 
precautionary action should be taken. However, the question arises as to how far 
environmental action may be sanctioned under the admittedly vague notion of 
“scientific uncertainty”.   
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The WTO Appellate Body’s decision in the Beef Hormones226 case examined the 
application of the precautionary principle as it is contained in Article 5 of the SPS 
Agreement.
227
  When no full scientific certainty exists, the SPS Agreement envisages 
the possibility of provisionally adopting precautionary measures that are to be 
reviewed as soon as possible – which entails a strict interpretation of the 
precautionary principle.
228
  It would be interesting to see whether the precautionary 
principle will find application outside the SPS Agreement in the WTO regime. 
 
5.7   The product versus process debate 
 
One of the major reasons why the US failed in defending its trade-restrictive measure 
in the Tuna-Dolphin cases was the fact that the Panels found it beyond the scope of 
Article III to examine the process involved in harvesting tuna, and instead only 
focused on the product as such.  The TBT and SPS Agreements cover process and 
production methods (“PPMs”) and allow trade measures based on direct PPMs where 
the product is affected thereby.
229
  More difficult is the question as to whether PPMs 
that do not directly impact on the final product (such as the way in which tuna is 
harvested) could also form the basis of a trade-restrictive environmental measure.  
 
It must be borne in mind that, with respect to the product/process debate, “the issue is 
not so much whether this distinction can be justified in all contexts, but rather how to 
develop some constraints on the potential misuse of process-oriented trade 
barriers.”230  Or, as was also stated:   
“Allowing trade restrictions on the basis of PPMs, however well intended, 
would allow trade to be restricted willy-nilly on the basis of any 
Member’s pet peeve and ultimately would favour only large countries able 
to throw their weight around.”231 
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It seems, though, as if the WTO Appellate Body has formulated a limited way in 
which PPMs can be taken into account, in that it will be permitted if it meets the 
conditions for the application of Article XX.
232
 Once again this is a significant 




6.1 Align the WTO agreements with MEAs 
 
One of the greatest challenges facing the WTO is the question as to how it will 





One of the proposed options for resolving those issues that may exist between the 
WTO and Multilateral Environmental Agreements (“MEAs”) is for Members to avoid 
using trade measures in MEAs that are inconsistent with their WTO obligations.
234
  
But, as one commentator puts it: 
“This is somewhat like trying to lower the murder rate by legalizing 
murder.  The result may look like an improvement on paper but the end 
result will be the same.  While this ‘solution’ will result in fewer 
complaints for the DSB, it will not help the environment.”235 
 
So, what could be done?  It is suggested that, should the WTO actively start to 
implement a paradigm shift in favour of increased environmental co-operation, the 
potential on a global scale is tremendous.  There are various reasons for this 
statement. 
 
Firstly, the broad membership of the WTO lends it very favourably to global 
implementation of standardised measures.  If one accepts the belief that international 
trade and global environmental protection are opposite sides of the same coin, it 
makes sense that the policies driving both should be formulated and co-ordinated by 
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the same body in order to effect a balance between trade liberalisation and responsible 
environmental stewardship. 
 
Secondly, it is recognised that one of the main problems experienced with 
international treaties is the lack of enforcement.  Should the WTO actively 
accommodate even a few of the major international environmental treaties, its dispute 
resolution mechanism could prove instrumental in harmonising environmentally 
sound trade practices, as it could be argued that the dispute resolution mechanism of 




In the context of the work on trade and environment, the GATT, and subsequently the 
WTO, has already undertaken a number of initiatives aiming to promote greater 
coherence and mutual supportiveness of trade and environmental policies.
237
  These 
include the hosting of information sessions, regional workshops and other side events 
at various MEA meetings.
238
  The Trade and Environment Work Programme adopted 
during the Doha Ministerial Conference also promises “without prejudice” 
negotiations on the increased status of MEAs vis-à-vis the WTO, as well as 




It is important to keep in mind that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(“the Vienna Convention“) contains provisions in Articles 31 and 32 that may require 
a reference to rules of international law other than those set out in the treaty itself or in 
agreements or instruments signed in connection with its conclusion, namely: 
 “any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions”240 and 
 “any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which 
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.”241 
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 “any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties”242 and 
 the non-exhaustive category of “supplementary means of interpretation” 




In the context of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, criticism has been levelled at 
the decision in Tuna Dolphin II where the Panel read Article 31(3)(a) as allowing 
reference only to treaty provisions other than those in the GATT that had been 
accepted by all GATT contracting parties.  Since CITES was not accepted by all 
GATT contracting parties, the Panel refused to take it into account.
244
  It has been 
argued that this finding is inconsistent with Article 31(3)(c), as the wording of the 
latter would seem to refer to the parties to the particular dispute, not to the parties to 
the multilateral agreement.
245
  Subsequently, in Shrimp-Turtle II the Panel found that 
“Malaysia and the United States have accepted or are committed to comply with all of 
the international instruments referred to by the Appellate Body” (in Shrimp-Turtle 
I).
246
  It has been argued that,  
“[e]ven though a particular treaty provision may not be legally binding on 
all WTO members, or not even on all disputing parties in a particular case, 
such treaty may still play a role under Art. 31(3)(c), if it can be said to 
reflect the ‘common intentions’ of WTO members, or under Art. 31(1) if it 
can be said to reflect the ‘ordinary meaning’ of a WTO treaty term.”247 
 
A very valid opinion therefore exists that other treaties, even those not acceded to by 
all WTO members or even the parties to a particular dispute, may be taken into 
account by the dispute resolution body.  It has also been suggested that Article XX 
could specifically be amended by adding a provision on MEAs.  Another alternative is 
to adopt a collective interpretation of Article XX that would validate existing MEAs 
as well as setting out criteria that they would have to fulfil to receive approval.
248
  
GATT Article XX (h) could easily be taken as a model for such a collective 
interpretation.  In Shrimp-Turtle 1 the Appellate Body upheld the right of WTO 
members to legislate for the protection of natural resources beyond national 
boundaries, provided they do so pursuant to an MEA (or pursuant to good faith 
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negotiations aimed at concluding an MEA).
249
  Other options that could be explored 
include increased involvement of MEA Secretariats in WTO dispute resolution 
procedures
250
; setting up an environmental advisory board; or referring to the 




6.2 Allow for greater transparency and participation in dispute settlement 
and improve the enforcement of rulings 
 
In the WTO, liberal economists and transnational corporate interests have dominated 
the discourse to advance free trade.  Among international organisations, the WTO is 
often regarded as among the most closed to stakeholder participation in its activities, 
with a “hostility” towards involvement of any kind, including other intergovernmental 
organisations, which are often prohibited even from participating as observers in 




A strongly worded critique of the way disputes are settled under the auspices of the 
WTO reads as follows:  “[a] highly politicised and arbitrary dispute resolution system 
relying on the personal whims of an ever-changing cast of characters is no way to 
operate the enforcement of the most powerful international agreement now in 
force.”253  It is suggested that some steps that could change this situation include: 
“(1) empowering other institutions to provide substantive expertise to 
which dispute Panels are bound (for instance the World Health 
Organization, through a public process, and not three trade lawyers 
meeting in secret, should determine whether a country’s…system actually 
serves a public health goal); (2) instituting venues for outside-of-WTO 
appeals of WTO Panel reports; and (3) explicitly forbidding decisions on 
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the merits of non-commercial claims (for example, the notion of three 
trade lawyers making subjective judgements about the quality of the 
science on beef hormone residues.)”254 
 
Another problem with the procedure followed by the DSB is that awards are drafted 
without the presence of the parties – Individual opinions of arbitrators are anonymous 
and, whenever dissenting, are excluded from the award.  It is commented that this 
situation serves to mask the true deliberations of the Panel and unfairly disadvantages 




It is therefore suggested that procedural rules should be revised to “[e]nhance third 
party rights in order to facilitate participation of both Northern NGOs and Southern 
sovereigns in WTO dispute settlements.”256   
 
Finally, it is suggested that the enforcement of DSB rulings should be made 
practicable as the current situation makes it too easy for superpowers to not comply 
with unfavourable rulings.
257
  It seems as if, in certain circumstances, the EU and 
possibly others, may prefer to see the imposition of sanctions rather than comply with 
the WTO ruling.
258
   The suggestion by Miller
259
 that the DSU be amended to make 
compensation not just a voluntary option, but also a compulsory measure, may be 
favourably viewed.  A proper interpretation of the precautionary principle discussed 
above, as well as the necessity to seek a political solution to problems with 
interpretation of Article XX is therefore essential. 
 
6.3   Seek political solutions 
 
One of the well-established principles of international law, namely that of state 
responsibility, should be given more prominence.  It has been suggested that one of 
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the primary difficulties with the current WTO dispute resolution system is that it 
appears as though the contracting parties have empowered the Panels and the 
Appellate Body to act as a developer or creator of international trade law, similar to 
the common law court systems of England and the US.
260
  The problem with this 
approach is that much of the subject matter that end up before the DSB contain a large 
political element, and in this sense the issue of state sovereignty should also be kept in 
mind.   
 
It is far more preferable to have the GATT contracting parties negotiate difficult 
issues, rather than to have the DSB develop case law on them.  It is therefore 
suggested that the Council or the Conference of Ministers should adopt an interpretive 
statement on Article XX, as this is the proper forum for an exercise of policy-making 
authority.
261
  Having clear guidelines will assist the DSB tremendously in its 
application of Article XX. 
 
6.4 Utilise alternative measures such as eco-labelling 
 
From the case discussions supra it is clear that there is no inherent conflict between 
the dual aims of trade liberalisation and protection of the environment.  In many of the 
cases, it seems as if the wording, or the way in which a trade-restrictive environmental 





A simple way of avoiding this situation altogether is to carefully word and apply such 
measures right from the start, but also to explore alternative, GATT-consistent 
environmental protection policies, such as in the controversial Tuna Dolphin I case 
where the Panel declared the use of eco-labels valid.
263
  The reason for this is that a 
reasonable non-discriminatory labelling requirement preserves both freedom of trade 
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Despite there being a certain amount of truth in the idea that international tribunals are 
solely concerned with questions of implementation, it ignores the political reality that 
policy-creation and policy-implementation are integrally linked.  The decisions of 
international tribunals as to whether or not the measures an individual state takes in 
implementing its environmental policy are compatible with the rules of free trade will 
necessarily have important implications for the policy itself.  Seen from a different 
perspective, one may point out that, whilst policy makers have so far been unable to 
effectively address most of the issues raised by the trade-environment question, the 
WTO as the foremost dispute resolution mechanism in this arena, has been forced to 
confront these issue as cases have arisen that required judicial pronouncement.   
 
From the analyses highlighted in this paper it could be seen that the dispute resolution 
machinery of the WTO have furthermore been forced to re-examine their approaches 
in the light of the increasing importance placed on environmental issues.  A much 
more purposive approach is becoming apparent, one in which a willingness to take the 
evolutionary nature of views regarding environment into account is evident.  It also 
seems as if dispute resolution bodies are, up to a certain extent, prepared to consider 
measures aimed at environmental protection per se as justifying restrictions on free 
trade.  In this sense, the supposed conflict between environmental protection and the 
liberalisation of international trade is more apparent than real. 
 
It is of crucial importance to remember that political concerns have historically been 
inseparable from international law.  It is submitted that the argument raised by the 
United States in Tuna Dolphin II
265
 still holds true:  “If the rules of the General 
Agreement should be re-examined in the light of the increasing complexity of issues 
regarding trade and the environment, that re-examination had to be conducted by the 
contracting parties, not a Panel.”  What would then be needed is that the relative 
importance of both aspects – liberalised international trade and the need to protect and 
conserve the environment – should be reconsidered, and clear, substantive guidelines 
should be formulated.  The policy makers – Nation States in their capacities as 
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international legal subjects and as members of the WTO, should do this.  Despite the 
trend towards more purposive legal analyses by the WTO dispute resolution bodies, 
they are not, after all, the true policy makers and should not be expected to act as 
such.  Even at the international level, and even with a decidedly more pro-
environment sentiment, the maxim ius dicere, sed non facere still apply to those 
tasked with settling disputes.   
  
 
 
